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Abstract
We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout.
Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is
the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from ab-
stention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters
on the winner’s side experience less regret than those on the
loser’s side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves pos-
itive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher
turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to
importance of the election and the competitiveness of the elec-
tion. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain
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about the composition of the electorate’s political preferences
and show similar phenomena emerge.
Keywords: voter turnout, regret, economics and psychology.
JEL codes: D72.
1 Introduction
After the 2000 US presidential election, CBS News / New York Times
conducted a poll of 1720 Americans November 10-12, 2007 and found
that 55% of those who did not vote regretted not voting.1 After the
surprising elimination of the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin at the
hands of the far-right anti-immigration candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen
in the first round of the 2002 French presidential election, many French
voters regretted their decision not to vote.2 Clearly, in these elections,
each individual voter’s decision would not have affected the outcome
of the election. Yet, voters who did not vote experienced regret after-
wards. In this paper, we maintain that psychological payoffs are an
important force in determining voting behavior. We posit that vot-
ers who do not vote in elections suffer regret and this gives them an
incentive to vote in elections.
The question of why people vote in large elections is one that has
occupied the minds of political scientists and economists alike. The
initial idea of the “rational voter paradox” is in the celebrated work
of Downs (1957). If voting is costly and the only motivation for peo-
ple to vote is to affect the outcome of the election, then they should
never vote. The reason is that in large elections the probability of
any single voter to affect the outcome of the election is infinitesimal.
However, observed turnout rates are quite high. Since the seminal
1CBS News, November 13, 2000. Since it was a national poll, many of these
voters reside in states where the election result was not in dispute.
2Financial Times, London, May 4, 2002, pg. 09.
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work of Downs, there has been a lot of attempts to explain this para-
dox. In our opinion, a satisfactory theoretical model has to be able
to achieve three goals. First, it must explain significantly positive
turnouts as equilibrium behavior in large elections. Second, it must
account for other frequently observed empirical facts, for example, the
positive correlation between turnout and the perceived competitive-
ness of elections. Lastly, it must be parsimonious so that the model
can be enriched to study other interesting issues in large elections, for
example, candidates’ political positioning.
In this paper, we explain voter turnout by introducing voter re-
gret. We study an election with two candidates and two corresponding
groups of voters. Voters who failed to vote in an election suffer regret.
The magnitude of a voter’s regret depends on whether or not his pre-
ferred candidate wins the election and on the margin of victory. The
smaller the margin of victory, the higher is the regret suffered by any
voter who did not vote. Moreover, for any fixed margin of victory, the
regret of a voter on the losing side is higher than that on the winning
side.3 We call this assumption “winner regrets less.” A potential voter
votes if and only if his cost of voting is less than the expected regret
he would suffer after the election if he did not vote.
Our model is a departure from the strictly “rational” model,
where the incentive to vote depends solely on the voter’s probabil-
ity of affecting the outcome. In fact, since we have a continuum of
voters in our model, the probability of any voter being pivotal is zero.
A common approach to explaining voter turnout is assuming that
voters derive utility from participation in elections, either because of
self-expression or sense of civic duty. We neither dispute the plausi-
bility of such concerns nor rule them out from our model. However,
3We want to de-emphasize the importance of a voter’s (nonzero) regret from
abstention while his favorite candidate wins. As we show in Example 2 in Sec-
tion 5, such regret is not necessary for our equilibrium construction when voters
are uncertain about the composition of preferences of the electorate.
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we enhance them with a psychological factor with an intuitive appeal.
Here, we give a short justification for our assumptions about voter
regret, and we provide in Section 6 a detailed discussion of the concept
of regret in our model. Voters feel regret if they do not vote because
failure to vote is viewed negatively in a democratic society. It is con-
ceivable that such negative (self-)perception is especially strong when
the election is close or when a voter’s favorite candidate lost the elec-
tion. One possible interpretation is that ethical voters are empathetic
towards those that belong to the same political group as theirs. Thus,
an ethical voter thinks his action disappoints his peers or his favorite
candidate if he does not vote.4 Such regret becomes more poignant
when the election result is close because the psychological effect of
the letdown is stronger. This is also consistent with the anecdotal
observation that voter apathy is contagious.
Assuming a decreasing density function of the distribution of the
cost of voting, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium with
a positive level of turnout. We account for the consistently observed
empirical facts, namely, that turnout is lower for the winning side, that
it is positively correlated with perceived closeness of the election, and
that it is positively correlated with the importance of the election.
We also allow voters to be uncertain about the composition of the
electorate’s political preferences, and derive similar results.
In our model, a voter votes because he anticipates that he will
experience regret if he does not. The voting equilibrium in our model
is a margin of victory and turnout levels for the two groups that are
consistent with each other. First, an anticipated margin of victory
determines a cost threshold for either group, such that voters with
voting cost below those thresholds vote in the election, and thereby
determines the turnouts for the two groups. Conversely, each pair of
4An ethical voter may also feel regret about not voting because this contributes
to making himself an apathetic person. This is reminiscent of arguments made
by Frank (1988) (Ch. 11, “Human Decency.”).
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turnout levels determines a resulting margin of victory. Consistency
requires the anticipated margin of victory and the resulting margin
of victory to be the same. The first condition requires that turnouts
decrease as the margin of victory increases, since regret is inversely
related to margin of victory. On the other hand, the second condition
causes margin of victory to increase as turnouts increase, given our
“winner regret less” assumption and the decreasing pdf of the cost
distribution. Therefore, there is a unique voting equilibrium.
Let us consider the intuition of the comparative statics results.
First, lower turnout for the winning side is simply implied by the fact
the winning voters regret less about not voting. Second, as the election
is perceived to be closer, fixing turnout levels, the anticipated winning
margin is going to be smaller. By our “winner regrets less” assumption
and the decreasing pdf of the cost distribution function, an increase
in turnout would cause the winning margin to increase. Thus, the
equilibrium turnout must increase to restore consistency. Finally, as
the election becomes more important, given the same winning mar-
gin, both turnouts will increase, causing the equilibrium turnout to
increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model of voting with
regrets. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and analyzes how
voter turnout varies with various factors. Section 5 introduces an
example in which there is uncertainty about the voter population.
Section 6 discusses the concept of regret in our model and its relation
to the existing literature. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible
extensions.
2 Related Literature
In this section, we discuss the relationship of our paper to the literature
on voter turnout. In Section 6, we discuss the concept of regret that
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we use in our model.
Since the work of Downs, there has been a large literature that
tries to explain voter turn-out in large elections. Most of the early
works starting with Tullock (1968) were decision theoretic models.
An important and controversial paper in this genre is by Ferejohn and
Fiorina (1974). Following Savage, in their model voters make partic-
ipation decisions not according to expected utility, but the minimax
regret criterion. The regret attached to an act ai if state Sj occurs is
the difference between what the decision maker would have attained
had he known the true state of nature and what he actually attains
by choosing ai.
5 They show that under some condition on the cost
parameter, a voter’s decision to vote for his most preferred candidate
is the act that minimizes the maximum regret. Their approach has
been subject to criticism in relation to the validity of minimax regret
as a choice criterion. A rational decision maker would use the mini-
max regret criterion only if he is uncertain about the outcome, in the
sense that he cannot estimate the probabilities of different outcomes
at all. Many researchers argue that this assumption is implausible. In
addition, the minimax regret criterion is also argued to lead to con-
tradictions. For example, it is possible for a voter to have a traffic
accident en route to the polls and get killed. Why would a minimax
regretter not stay home instead?6 In addition, their model is a deci-
sion theoretic model rather than game theoretic. In that sense, our
model is not closely related to theirs.
Our model is closer in spirits to that of Riker and Ordeshook
(1968). They analyze a model of voter participation in which agents
receive a duty payoff D > 0 when they vote for their preferred candi-
date. In our model, one can reinterpret regret as a payoff (negative)
5For a detailed description of this criterion, see Luce and Raiffa (1957), pp.
280-282.
6For a sample of such criticisms, see Beck (1975), Mayer and Good (1975),
and Tullock (1975).
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that the agents receive for not voting for their preferred candidate.
However, in their model the payoff D is independent of the election
outcome, which is fitting to the duty payoff interpretation. In our
model, by contrast, for any fixed level of the margin of victory, the
regret that a voter on the losing side incurs is higher than that in-
curred by one on the winning side. Moreover, regret is a decreasing
function of the margin of victory. This, together with assumptions on
the distribution of voting cost, allows our model to deliver compara-
tive statics that is different from that of Riker and Ordeshook (1968).
For example, in Riker and Ordeshook’s model, turnout level is fixed
and independent of the relative size of the minority. By contrast, our
model predicts that turnout will be higher among the minority than
among the majority and yet the majority’s preferred candidate wins.
Moreover, turnout progressively diminishes as the size of the minority
goes down. In addition, in our model, turnout increases as the size
of the minority approaches the size of the majority and as the im-
portance of election increases. These are well in line with empirical
evidence.7
Feddersen and Sandroni (2006c) (see also Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006a) (2006b)) generate similar comparative statics using a more in-
volved model than ours. In their model, there are both ethical and
nonethical voters. The former are called “rule-utilitarian,” who derive
a positive payoff from taking the ethical action, namely the one that
is called for by the minimization the social cost of voting. Therefore,
voting is not necessarily the ethical action to take, which is determined
endogenously in their model. Hence, voters have to know about the
equilibrium aggregate behavior of all voters to decide what is the eth-
ical thing to do. Also, in their model, there is the possibility that a
voter abstains from an election and feels “righteous” about his choice
not to vote. These two features are in stark contrast to Riker and
7See, for example, Blais (2000) and Coate and Conlin (2004).
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Ordeshook’s and our model, where voters’ ethical concerns are “pri-
vate” in that they do not take into account other voters’ cost of voting
and where voting is the always the ethical thing to do. Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006c) impose a consistency condition on the behavior of
the agents and look for consistent behavior profiles. They show that
consistent behavior corresponds to a pure strategy equilibrium of a
suitably defined two-player game. In order for the existence of the
pure strategy equilibrium, they impose that the fractions of voters
(both in the majority and in the minority group) who take the ethi-
cal action are random variables. In contrast, the voters in our model
are all ethical and our equilibrium construction works regardless of
whether voters are certain about the composition of voter preferences
for candidates. Moreover, in their model the comparative statics re-
sults crucially depend on the fact that agents in both groups (the
majority and the minority) care about aggregate voting costs rather
than voting costs of the members of their own group. By contrast,
in our model each voter only cares about his own cost. In short,
our model can be viewed as a more parsimonious one with different
theoretical justification.
Thus, our paper can be put in the broad category of research
that uses “ethical-voter” models. The survey on political economy
by Merlo (2006) contains a concise discussion of various voter turnout
models.8
The first game-theoretical papers on voter turnout use the so-
called pivotal-voter model. Ledyard (1982) is the first to analyze the
problem of voting behavior in large elections using game theoretic
models. The model also allows endogenous party-positions. The paper
does not however characterize turnout levels though there are some ex-
amples. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) study a simplified version of the
Ledyard model with complete information. They show that in the vot-
8See also Aldrich (1993), Feddersen (2004) and Dhillon and Peralta (2002).
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ing game with complete information there are multiple equilibria. The
model shows that it is possible to have high turnout equilibrium even
with large electorates. However, this large turnout equilibrium cru-
cially depends on the assumption of complete information. Indeed, as
shown by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), with incomplete information
regarding the voting costs, there is essentially a unique low turnout
equilibrium for large electorates. Myerson (1998) adds another source
of uncertainty in elections by considering games with population un-
certainty. In a setting where population uncertainty is modelled as a
Poisson process, it is shown that the low turn-out equilibrium is the
unique prediction.
According to the classification proposed by Merlo (2006),9 in ad-
dition to the pivotal-voter and ethical-voter models, there is a third
category: uncertain-voter model, where turnout is related to voters
uncertainty about who is the best candidate. In all such models (e.g.,
those of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), Matsusaka (1995), Degan
(2006) and Degan and Merlo (2007)), the possibility of voting for the
wrong candidate engenders a cost and therefore uncertain voters may
prefer to abstain. While in Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1996) model
such a cost depends on pivotal considerations, in the models of Degan
(2006) and Degan and Merlo (2007), as in ours, it is a psychological
cost derived from doing the wrong thing, not because of the effect a
voter’s decision has on the outcome. In Matsusaka’s (1995) model, a
voter’s utility from voting is explicitly defined as a function increasing
in the quality of his information. Unlike in the other three papers and
ours, a voter has no strategic considerations in Matsusaka’s model.
There exists a literature that aims to explain voter turnout as
results of learning or evolution. Diermeier and Mieghem (2000) study
9Another branch of literature explains voter turnout as the result of mobi-
lization by group leaders. See Uhlaner (1989), Morton (1991), and Shachar and
Nalebuff (1999). They do not explicitly model why, however, leaders are able to
influence voters’ decisions.
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a model of voter turnout where in each period a randomly selected
voter receives information about turnout through polls and plays best
response based on Bayesian updating. They show that large turnout
is possible in large elections when voting factions are of similar size.
There are also papers by Conley, Toossi, and Wooders (2001) and Sieg
and Schulz (1995), who use evolutionary models and investigate con-
ditions under which high turnout survives. Their research may also be
interpreted as providing explanation to why voters may have ethical
preferences.
We know of two other papers that assume voters’ utility endoge-
nously depends on the election outcome. Llavador (2006) introduces a
model in which voters care about the margin of victory out of instru-
mental concerns, for example, power sharing between parties according
to their received votes. In his model, each voter has an ideal margin of
victory for a candidate. So, each voter decides whom to vote for based
on both her preferences on the winning margin and whom the other
voters are voting for. By contrast, a voter in our model only votes
for his favorite candidate, and makes participation decisions based
on whether the other voters are voting. Callander (2007, forthcom-
ing) studies performance of the sequential voting systems when voters
have a preference for voting for the eventual winning candidate. He
shows that sequential voting aggregates information better in lopsided
elections and simultaneous voting is better in tight elections.
Recently, there has been some interesting work that empirically
or experimentally tests voting models. Coate and Conlin (2004) struc-
turally estimate a modified version of the rule-utilitarian voter model
of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006c) and find evidence supporting it
over simple expressive voting. Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2004) test
the pivotal-voter model with small elections, and find that it is out-
performed by an expressive voting model. Degan and Merlo (2007)
structurally estimate a model of turnout and voting in multiple elec-
tions, using data from the US presidential and congressional elections.
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They find their structural model matches data quite well and utilize
the model to perform counterfactual analysis of the effect of policies
that increase voter information or sense of civic duty. Levine and Pal-
frey (2006, forthcoming) test the pivotal-voter model in small elections
in the lab and argue that a combination of the pivotal-voter model and
the logit equilibrium explains the experimental data well.
3 The Model
Two candidates, A and B, compete for one position in an election.
Correspondingly, there are two types of voters. Let us call them A-
voters and B-voters respectively. Each voter favors the candidate that
bears the same label as his own. Voters are uniformly distributed on
the interval [0, 1], with A-voters occupying [0, α] and B-voters occu-
pying (α, 1]. We assume
α >
1
2
.
Let δ and 0 be respectively the utility a voter gets when his fa-
vorite candidate gets elected and when the opposing candidate gets
elected, due to the different policies they will implement. So, δ can be
interpreted as the importance of the election.
Let c be the cost of voting, a random variable that are distributed
on [0,+∞) according to the same distribution function F and density
function f for both A- and B-voters. The parameters α, δ, and F are
common knowledge among voters.
A significant part of the cost of voting is the opportunity cost.
The opportunity cost of voting for a retiree is lower than that for an
active worker. The opportunity cost of voting for a worker with a
flexible schedule is lower than that for a worker with a rigid one.
A I−voter’s expected “material” payoff from voting for candidate
J is
−c,
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as the probability of his vote affecting the election outcome is zero,
given that we have a continuum of voters.
In addition to his material payoff, a voter incurs regret when
the election is close and he fails to vote or votes for the opposing
candidate. The level of regret is determined by the closeness of the
election. The closer the election, the higher the regret.In addition, his
regret from not voting is larger when his favorite candidate loses by a
certain margin than when the candidate wins by the same margin.
Since a voter experiences regret if he votes for the wrong can-
didate, voting for the opposing candidate is dominated by voting for
one’s favorite candidate. Therefore, we will only consider the case
where voters vote for their favorite candidate if they vote at all.
We define candidate I’s margin of victory to be equal to the
difference between the number of voters voting for candidate I and
the number of those voting for his opponent, −I. Let τA and τB be
the turnouts for each type of voters. Thus, candidate A’s margin of
victory is
mA = ατA − (1− α)τB.
We assume the voter’s regret takes the form
R(m, δ) = δr(m),
where m is the margin of victory (or, margin of loss if m < 0) for the
voter’s favorite candidate. Hereafter, we will refer to the function R as
the absolute regret function, and r as the relative regret function, or
simply the regret function. Note that absolute regret is simply relative
regret scaled up by δ, which measures the importance of the election.
A voter’s expected payoff from not voting is
−δEm(r(m)).
The function r is nonnegative, continuously differentiable except
possibly atm = 0, strictly increasing form < 0, and strictly decreasing
for m > 0.
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For clarity of exposition, we separate the regret function into two
parts: r− : R− → R+ and r+ : R+ → R+. They are defined by
r−(m) = r(m) for m < 0;
r+(m) = r(m) for m > 0;
r−(0) = lim
m→0−
r(m);
r+(0) = lim
m→0+
r(m).
We assume that r has the following property.
Assumption 1. (Winner regrets less.) The regret function r satisfies:
a. r−(0) ≥ r+(0);
b.
r′−(−m)
−r′+(m) < 1 for all m > 0.
The first part of the assumption says that when an abstaining
voter’s favorite candidate loses by an arbitrarily small margin, his re-
gret is higher than that if his favorite candidate wins by an arbitrarily
small margin. The second part can be interpreted as: “when the mar-
gin of victory increases by a small amount, the decrease in regret for
an abstaining voter on the winner’s side is more than that if he is
on the loser’s side.” In other words, “a winner gets complacent more
easily.” These two parts imply
r+(m) < r−(−m)
for all m > 0, or “winner regrets less.”
4 Equilibrium
We look for equilibria of the model defined as follows.
Definition 1. A voting equilibrium is a profile of strategy and beliefs
that satisfies:
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a. each voter forms Bayesian beliefs about the result of the election;
b. based on these beliefs, each voter chooses to vote or not based
on the expected utility of these two alternatives;
c. the candidate with a majority of the votes wins.
As we concluded in the previous section, the pivotal probability
for any single voter is zero. Therefore, a voter chooses to vote if
−c < −δEm(r(m)) or δEm(r(m)) > c. (1)
and not to vote if the inequality goes the other direction. If the two
alternatives give him the same utility, he can choose either option.
We focus on the case α > 1/2. That is, a majority of voters prefer
candidate A to B. As we will demonstrate below, this will preclude
the possibility of a tie in the election.
First, observe that if an I−voter (I = A,B) of cost c finds it
optimal to vote, then another I−voter of cost c′ < c must also find it
optimal to vote. Therefore, the equilibrium can be characterized by
two cutoff cost values for each group of voters, cA and cB. Thus, the
equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
τA = F (cA), (2)
τB = F (cB), (3)
cA = δr(ατA − (1− α)τB), (4)
cB = δr((1− α)τB − ατA). (5)
The following lemma states that the candidate with a higher pro-
portion of supporters, A, wins the election.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, voters on the winner’s side must have a
lower turnout. Hence, A must win the election in equilibrium.
14
Proof. The first statement is a direct consequence of Assumption 1. A
voter on the winner’s side has lower regret. Therefore, the cutoff cost
value for the winner’s side must be lower, which implies lower turnout
since both types have the same cost distribution, F .
The second statement is implied by the first. Since α > 1
2
, in
order for B to win, B-voters must have a higher turnout than A-
voters, which contradicts the first statement.
Note that the above discussion is conditional on the existence of
an equilibrium, to which we turn now. As we know A wins the election
in equilibrium, let m be the winning margin by A. From equations (4)
and (5), we have
τA = F (δr(m)), (6)
τB = F (δr(−m)), (7)
m = ατA − (1− α)τB. (8)
A triple (τA, τB,m) constitutes a voting equilibrium outcome if and
only if it is a solution to equations (6), (7), and (8). Together, they
imply
m = αF (δr(m))− (1− α)F (δr(−m)). (9)
An m that satisfies the above equation uniquely determines a voting
equilibrium outcome.
Let us use µ(·) to denote the function defined by the right hand
side of (9).10
The right hand side of Equation (9) can be interpreted as the
resulting winning margin by candidate A given that A-voters with
voting costs lower than or equal to δr(m) vote in the election and
B-voters with voting costs lower than or equal to δr(−m) vote in the
10Note that µ is a function of α, δ, F (·), and m. However, whenever without
confusion, we treat it as only a function of m. In this sense, an m satisfying (9) is
a fixed point of µ.
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election. Thus, an equilibrium winning margin m is a fixed point of
the function µ(·).
We make the following assumption to guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium.
Assumption 2. αF (δr+(0))− (1− α)F (δr−(0)) > 0.
Intuitively, the assumption requires that when the winning mar-
gin is arbitrarily close to zero, the voters on the majority side who
prefer voting to abstention will outnumber such voters on the minor-
ity side. That is, the majority voters will not be so complacent as to
make the election outcome to go the other way. Mathematically, tak-
ing α and F as fixed, this assumption requires that the discontinuity
of r at 0 cannot be too severe.11 In particular, if r is continuous at 0,
then this assumption is satisfied as α > 1
2
.
Theorem 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists at least one
voting equilibrium.
Proof. We show this by applying the intermediate value theorem to (9).
First, by our assumptions, both sides of (9) are continuous func-
tions of m.
Second, when m = 0, the right hand side of (9), µ(m), is positive
by Assumption 2. Therefore, m < µ(m) at m = 0.
Third, let m = α. Then,
µ(m) ≤ (2α− 1)F (δr(m)) ≤ 2α− 1 < α,
where the first inequality is implied by Assumption 1 and the third
inequality by α > 1
2
. Therefore, m > µ(m) at m = α.
Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, we conclude there exists
m ∈ (0, α) such that µ(m) = m.
11This assumption is necessary here since we have an essentially deterministic
model. We show in Section 5, however, this is not the case when there is uncer-
tainty about α.
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The uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed with the given
set of assumptions. The following is a sufficient condition.
Assumption 3. The density function of cost distribution, f , is non-
increasing.
A rough interpretation of the assumption is that voters with low
costs are more populous than those with high costs.
Theorem 2. Given Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Consider equation (9). It suffices to show its right hand side,
µ(m), is non-increasing in m.
To see this, observe that
µ′(m) = αf(δr(m))δr′+(m) + (1− α)f(δr(−m))δr′−(−m), (10)
which we conclude to be negative by Assumptions 1 and 3 and α > 1
2
.
Thus, the solution to (9) is unique, which implies uniqueness of
equilibrium.
To understand the argument for uniqueness, note that in equi-
librium candidate A wins the election and that the winning margin
m uniquely determines the equilibrium. Let us consider an alter-
native equilibrium with a lower winning margin for A. Thus, the
turnouts of A-voters and B-voters should both increase. However,
since the corresponding cutoff cost level for B−voters is higher than
that for A−voters (Assumption 1) and the density of high-cost voters
is lower (Assumption 3), since the cutoff level for B−voters increases
at a slower rate than that for A−voters (Assumption 1), and since
B−voters are less populous, this will cause A’s winning margin to go
up, contradicting our stipulation that the winning margin goes down.
We can derive a similar contradiction if we try to find an equilibrium
with a higher winning margin. Thus, there is only winning margin
that ensures the resulting turnouts produce exactly the same winning
17
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Figure 1: The determination of the equilibrium winning margin by
A. The function µ maps from an anticipated margin to a resulting
margin.
margin, or the turnouts and winning margin are “mutually consis-
tent.”
Figure 1 demonstrates the determination of the equilibrium win-
ning margin when Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.
The following lemma makes explicit the relationship between turnout
and margin of victory in equilibrium as an implication of properties
of the regret function.
Lemma 2. Fix the importance of the election, δ, the regret function,
r, and the cost distribution, F . In equilibrium, turnouts for A- and
B-voters, τA and τB, are inversely related to the winning margin, m.
Proof. This is simply a consequence of the equilibrium equations, and
the properties of the regret function, r.
Note that the turnouts in the above lemma is the within-group
turnout, not the total turnout of all voters. The lemma states that
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if a change in parameter values causes the turnout in A-voters (or
B-voters) to rise, it must also cause the winning margin to drop.
We now turn to comparative statics of turnouts with respect to
various aspects of the election. First, turnouts are inversely related to
the dominance of the majority, or positively related to the competi-
tiveness of the election.12
Theorem 3. Turnouts for A- and B-voters, τA and τB, are decreasing
in α. Furthermore, the total turnout, τ = ατA + (1 − α)τB, is also
decreasing in α.
Proof. We show that the equilibrium turnout, m, increases as α in-
creases. Then, by Lemma 2, both τA and τB are decreasing in α.
As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 2, the right hand side
of (9), µ(·), is strictly decreasing in m. Note also the left hand side
of (9) does not depend on α. In addition,
∂µ
∂α
= τA + τB > 0.
A direct application of the implicit function theorem gives us the de-
sired conclusion. In fact,
dm
dα
= − τA + τB
µ′(m)− 1 ,
where the denominator is negative and the numerator positive. The
negative sign in front of the expression implies the whole expression
is positive.
12One need use caution in interpreting this result. As Lemma 2 states, the
equilibrium turnout is inversely related to the equilibrium winning margin, or the
realized lopsidedness of the election. However, it is not immediately clear that
the ex ante lopsidedness of the election will translate into realized lopsidedness.
Theorem 3 shows that such translation does occur. Thus, it is appropriate to
interpret the theorem as saying turnouts increase with the perceived lopsidedness
of the election. See also Corollary 6.3 in Section 5.
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We now turn to how the total turnout, τ = ατA+(1−α)τB, varies
with α. We have
dτ
dα
= τA − τB + αdτA
dα
+ (1− α)dτB
dα
.
First, observe τA < τB in equilibrium by Lemma 1. Second, both
dτA/dα and dτB/dα are negative. Thus, we may conclude
dτ
dα
< 0.
This theorem states that within-group turnouts must decrease as
the winning side becomes more dominant, or the level of disagreement
among all voters becomes lower. As the dominance of majority in-
creases, the resulting winning margin at a given level of turnout for
A−voters is higher. Thus, the equilibrium turnout has to decrease to
restore the consistency between turnout and winning margin. In the
meantime, the total turnout also decreases, as the turnouts for both
groups are lower and more weight is put on the low-turnout group,
the A−voters.
Our next result concerns the relationship between turnouts and
the importance of the election.
Theorem 4. Turnouts for A- and B-voters, τA and τB, are increasing
in the importance of the election, δ. In addition, the total turnout, τ ,
is also increasing in δ.
Proof. We discuss τA only, as the argument for τB is similar. From (6),
we have
dτA
dδ
= f(δr(m))
(
r(m) + δr′+(m)
dm
dδ
)
.
Consider again Equation (9). Its left hand side does not depend on δ.
But derivative of the right hand side with respect to δ can be written
∂µ
∂δ
= αf(δr(m))r(m)− (1− α)f(δr(−m))r(−m).
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Applying the implicit function theorem to (9), we have
dm
dδ
= − ∂µ/∂δ
µ′(m)− 1 .
Using (10), we have
dτA
dδ
=
δ(1− α)f(δr(−m))[r(m)r′−(−m) + r(−m)r′+(m)]− r(m)
µ′(m)− 1 .
Assumption 1 implies the first term in the numerator is negative. Since
µ′(m) < 0 as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 2, we conclude
dτA/dδ > 0. Similarly, dτB/dδ > 0. Combining them, we have τ =
ατA + (1− α)τB also increases in δ.
Note that the relationship between the equilibrium winning mar-
gin and the importance of the election is ambiguous. If a higher δ
always caused µ(·), the “resulting winning margin,” to rise, then equi-
librium winning margin would go up, and it would go down if a higher
δ had the opposite effect. Fixing a winning margin, an increase in the
importance of election causes turnouts of both groups to increase. The
effect on A-voters, the winning group, is weaker than on B-voters by
the assumption of “winner regrets less.” However, since the pdf of the
cost distribution is non-increasing, and since there are more A-voters
than B-voters, the marginal effect of an increase in the importance of
the election on the resulting margin is ambiguous.
Despite such ambiguity in the relationship between the equilib-
rium margin and the importance of the election, the previous theorem
states that turnouts always increase with the importance of the elec-
tion. The reason is that even if an increase in the importance of the
election causes the equilibrium winning margin to go up, thereby hav-
ing the indirect effect of causing turnouts to fall, such effect is offset
by the direct turnout-increasing effect of an increase in the importance
of the election.
We now turn to the investigation of the relationship between vot-
ing cost and equilibrium voter turnout. Here, our results are more
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limited in scope. Intuitively, since voters base their decisions on the
comparison between their voting cost and expected regret, if the cost
of voting becomes higher, turnout should become lower. However,
since lower turnouts may result in a closer election, which increases
voters’ anticipated regret, the eventual effect of an increase in the cost
of voting is not clear-cut. Below, we provide sufficient conditions for
turnouts to decrease as voting becomes more costly.
Theorem 5. Suppose F and G are two distributions of the voting cost
that satisfy Assumption 3, where F first order stochastically dominates
G. If, in addition, either of the following conditions is satisfied, then
turnouts for A-voters and B-voters are both lower under F than under
G.
1. The margin of victory under F is higher than that under G.
2. The distribution function F is a rightward shift of G, that is,
F (c) = G(c − ε) for all some ε > 0 and all c in the support of
F .
Proof. 1. This is a direct implication of the property that the regret
function is inversely related to the margin of victory and the
assumption that F first order stochastically dominates G.
2. Denote the equilibrium margins of victory for candidate A under
F and G respectively by m∗ and m′, and similarly the equilib-
rium turnouts for J-voters (J = A,B) by τ ∗J and τ
′
J .
First, we argue that m∗ < m′. By assumption, for all m,
αG(δr(m))− (1− α)G(δr(−m)) > αG(δr(m)− ε)− (1− α)G(δr(−m)− ε),
because (i) r(m) < r(−m) by Assumption 1; (ii) G satisfies
Assumption 3; (iii) α > 1
2
. But, the right hand side of the
inequality is equal to αF (δr(m)) − (1 − α)F (δr(−m)). This
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means that compared to G, F shifts µ downwards in Figure 1.
As a result, the equilibrium winning margin must be lower under
F than under G.
Second, we argue that τ ∗A < τ
′
A and τ
∗
B < τ
′
B. Suppose instead
either τ ∗A ≥ τ ′A or τ ∗B ≥ τ ′B. Note
τ ∗A = F (δr(m
∗)) = G(δr(m∗)− ε), τ ′A = G(δr(m′));
τ ∗B = F (δr(−m∗)) = G(δr(−m∗)− ε), τ ′B = G(δr(−m′)).
Thus, either δr(m∗) − ε ≥ δr(m′) or δr(−m∗) − ε ≥ δr(−m′).
But given m∗ < m′,
(δr(m∗)− ε− δr(m′))− (δr(−m∗)− ε− δr(−m′)) = δ
∫ m∗
m′
r′(m) + r′(−m)dm > 0,
by the second part of Assumption 1. Thus,
δr(m∗)− ε− δr(m′) ≥ max{δr(−m∗)− ε− δr(−m′), 0}.
Since r(−m′) > r(m′), α > 1/2, and G satisfies Assumption 3,
we have
αG(δr(m∗)− ε)− (1− α)G(δr(−m∗)− ε) > αG(δr(m′))− (1− α)G(δr(−m′)),
or m∗ > m′, contradicting our conclusion above. Thus, τ ∗J < τ
′
J
for J = A,B.
We now present an example that illustrates the voting equilibrium
in our model.
Example 1. Suppose the regret function takes the following form:
r(m) =

1− 2m, if m ∈ [0, 1
2
],
1 +m, if m ∈ [−1, 0],
0, otherwise.
In addition, assume that voting cost is uniformly distributed on [0, C]
with C ≥ δ (this is to ensure no corner solutions exist in which all
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B-voters vote). Substituting these into the equilibrium equations, we
obtain
m =
(2α− 1)δ
C + (3α− 1)δ ,
τA = δ
1 + (1− α)δ/C
C + (3α− 1)δ ,
τB = δ
1 + αδ/C
C + (3α− 1)δ .
The equilibrium margin of victory is decreasing in C and increasing
in α. Both turnouts increase with δ, and increase as α approaches 1
2
,
which confirms Theorems 3 and 4. Note distributions with higher C
FOSD distributions with lower C. The turnouts are decreasing with
C, which means higher voting costs induces lower turnouts.
5 Uncertainty about the Electorate’s Po-
litical Preferences
In the previous sections, we have introduced an essentially determinis-
tic model. In equilibrium, a voter correctly anticipates the outcome of
the election and the exact value of his regret if he fails to vote. We be-
lieve the model captures the idea that voter participation is driven by
anticipated regret from not voting. In reality, of course, voters are un-
certain about the election outcome. To encompass this in our model,
we may allow α to be uncertain to each voter, while maintaining our
assumptions about the regret function.
To be specific, let G be the distribution of α and g its correspond-
ing density function.
Assumption 4. The density function g is symmetric around 1
2
, non-
decreasing in [0, 1
2
], and nonincreasing in [1
2
, 1].
Note that this implies that G second order stochastically dom-
inates the uniform distribution (G can be the uniform distribution
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itself). We may write the equilibrium equations as
τA = F (cA),
τB = F (cB),
cA = δ
∫ 1
0
r(ατA − (1− α)τB)G(dα),
cB = δ
∫ 1
0
r((1− α)τB − ατA)G(dα).
Our next theorem demonstrates that a unique positive-turnout
equilibrium exists in the voting game with uncertainty about α.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then, in the voting
game with uncertainty, there exists a unique equilibrium with positive
turnout, in which τA = τb = τ
∗, where τ ∗ satisfies
F−1(τ) = δ
∫ 1
0
r((1− 2α)τ)G(dα). (11)
Proof. First, we show that in equilibrium, τA = τB. Suppose instead
τA > τB. With a change of variables in the equilibrium characteriza-
tion above, we have
cA − cB = δ
τA + τB
∫ τA
−τB
[r(m)− r(−m)] g( τB +m
τA + τB
)dm
=
δ
τA + τB
∫ τA
τB
[r(m)− r(−m)] g( τB +m
τA + τB
)dm
+
δ
τA + τB
∫ τB
−τB
[r(m)− r(−m)] g( τB +m
τA + τB
)dm.
The first term on the right hand side is negative by our “winner regrets
less” assumption (Assumption 1). The second term can be rewritten
as
δ
τA + τB
∫ τB
0
[r(m)− r(−m)]
[
g(
τB +m
τA + τB
)− g( τB −m
τA + τB
)
]
dm.
By Assumption 4 and the assumption τA > τB, we have g(
τB+m
τA+τB
) −
g( τB−m
τA+τB
) > 0 for all m ∈ (0, τB]. Therefore, the second term is also
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negative by Assumption 1. Hence cA < cB, which contradicts our
assumption that τA > τB. Thus, in equilibrium, τA = τB.
Now, we demonstrate that a unique equilibrium exists. Let τ
denote the turnout level for both groups. The equilibrium condition
becomes (11). The left hand side is strictly increasing and the right
hand side strictly decreasing in τ . Furthermore, when τ = 0, F−1(τ) =
0, while the right hand side is strictly positive; when τ → 1, F−1(τ)
approaches ∞ if the voting cost c has an unbounded support,13 while
the right hand remains bounded. Therefore, there exists a unique τ ∗
that satisfies the equilibrium condition.
The following two corollaries consider how voting cost and the
importance of the election affect turnout. The higher the voting cost,
the lower the turnout; the more important the election is, the higher
the turnout. The former is different from our result in the determin-
istic case, mainly because here the two groups are ex ante symmetric
while it is not the case in the deterministic case. The latter is similar
to that in the deterministic case.
Corollary 6.1. Let F˜ and F be two distributions of voting cost, c,
such that F˜ first order stochastically dominates F . Then, the equilib-
rium voter turnout is lower under F˜ than that under F .
Corollary 6.2. The equilibrium voter turnout is increasing in δ, the
importance of the election.
The proofs are straightforward and omitted here. They use simi-
lar arguments to those in the proof of Corollary 6.3.
Our next result concerns how voter turnouts are affected by vot-
ers’ uncertainty about α.
13If c has a bounded support, we need to make the assumption that the upper
bound is large enough.
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Corollary 6.3. Let G and G˜ be two distributions of α that satisfy
Assumption 4 and let G˜ second order stochastically dominate G. Then,
the equilibrium voter turnout under G˜ is higher than that under G.
Proof. Note that the equilibrium turnout is the τ at which the left
hand and right hand sides of (11) intersect. Also, the left hand side is
increasing while the right hand side is decreasing in τ . Thus, it suffices
to show that under G˜, the right hand side of (11) is shifted up from
that under G. Using integration by parts, we have∫ 1
0
r((1− 2α)τ)G˜(dα)−
∫ 1
0
r((1− 2α)τ)G(dα)
= r((2α− 1)τ)[G˜(α)−G(α)] |1α=0 −
∫ 1
0
[G˜(α)−G(α)]dr((2α− 1)τ)dα.
The first term is equal to zero. The second term can be rewritten
−
∫ 1
2
0
[G˜(α)−G(α)]2τr′((2α− 1)τ)dα−
∫ 1
1
2
[G˜(α)−G(α)]2τr′((2α− 1)τ)dα.
Using Assumption 4 and the assumption that G˜ seconde order stochas-
tically dominates G, we have
G˜(α)−G(α) < 0 when α ∈ (0, 1
2
);
G˜(α)−G(α) > 0 when α ∈ (1
2
, 1).
Combining these with the assumption that r′(m) is positive for m < 0
and negative for m > 0, we conclude∫ 1
0
r((1− 2α)τ)G˜(dα)−
∫ 1
0
r((1− 2α)τ)G(dα) > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium turnout under G˜ is higher than that under
G.
The above theorem shows that if the election is anticipated to
be close, then voter turnout is higher, again echoing our result in the
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deterministic case. The reason is that as elections become close, a
voter is more likely to experience a high regret if he does not vote.14
The assumption that a voter experiences regret even if his favorite
candidate wins may appear counterintuitive. Our answer to this cri-
tique is two-fold. First, as mentioned in Section 3, although we use
regret as justification for voter participation, we do not exclude the
possibility of “warm glow” utility from voting, which is independent
of the (anticipated) election outcome. Second, as the following nu-
merical example demonstrates, when we allow uncertainty about α, it
is not necessary to require voters on the winning side to have positive
regret.
Example 2. Consider the regret function
r(m) =
{
1 +m, if m ∈ [−1, 0],
0, otherwise.
Again, the cost distribution is uniform on [0, C], where C ≥ δ
2
. In
addition, we assume that it is common knowledge that α is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. Thus,
τA =
cA
C
,
τB =
cB
C
,
cA = δ
∫
ατA−(1−α)τB≤0
1 + (ατA − (1− α)τB)dα,
cB = δ
∫
ατA−(1−α)τB≥0
1 + ((1− α)τB − ατA)dα.
Again, we can show that in equilibrium τA = τB by deriving a con-
tradiction from supposing they are not equal. Solving the equations
14A similar result is obtained by Taylor and Yildirim (2005). They show that
when voters are strategic, giving them more information about the composition of
the voting population increases turnout. But, it also increases the possibility that
the election turns out in favor of the minority candidate.
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gives us
τA = τB =
2δ
4C + δ
.
Clearly, the turnout is increasing in the importance of the election δ.
In addition, it is decreasing in the upper bound of the cost, C, which
implies that in this case higher voting cost causes lower turnout.
6 The Concept of Regret
In this section, we elaborate on the concept of regret used in our model,
and compare our use with its use in the literature.
Regret is a widely observed psychological phenomenon. Accord-
ing to Landman (1993),
Regret is a more or less painful cognitive and emotional
state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses,
transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes. It is an expe-
rience of felt-reason or reasoned- emotion. The regretted
matters may be sins of commission as well as sins of omis-
sion; they may range from the voluntary to the uncontrol-
lable and accidental; they may be actually executed deeds
or entirely mental ones committed by oneself or by another
person or group; they may be moral or legal transgressions
or morally and legally neutral. . . .(p. 36)
It is commonly known that regret tends to have an unpleasant emo-
tional effect on an individual’s mind. Therefore, it is natural to expect
that while making decisions, people take the anticipated regret into
account, at least, in situations where they are frequently involved.
Some economic and decision theorists have emphasized the role
of anticipated regret in decision making. Loomes and Sugden (1982)
and Bell (1982) propose decision regret as explanations of paradoxical
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behavior that cannot be accommodated by expected utility theory.
The concept of regret in these models is very narrowly defined. For
example, Bell (1982) defines it as “the difference in value between the
actual assets received and the highest level of assets produced by other
alternatives.”As a result, the application of their theory to economic
models is quite limited.
In psychological research, by contrast, regret has increasingly be-
come recognized as an important factor in decision making.15 One of
the first such studies is by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). Subsequent
studies have revealed many interesting characteristics of regret. For
example, people regret less about choices with justifications (Inman
and Zeelenberg (2002)); they regret more about behavior inconsistent
with their intentions (Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005)); they regret more
about inactions than actions in the long run and vice versa in the short
run (Gilovich and Medvec (1995)); and so on. Connolly and Zeelen-
berg (2002) propose Decision Justification Theory to explain many
empirical phenomena related to regret and decision making. They
break down regret into bad-outcome regret and self-blame regret. A
person suffers the former if as a result of his action or inaction a bad
outcome occurs, and suffers the latter if his action was unjustified or
unwise regardless of what outcome occurs.
In our model, we introduce regret as an enhancement of Riker
and Ordeshook’s civic-duty model. We believe that the “warm glow”
utility received by a voter as a result of fulfilling his civic duty should
be independent of the election outcome. In addition to this type of
utility, we believe voters’ psychological involvement in the success or
failure of their favorite candidates or alternatives is a significant factor
15The psychologist Neal Roese at University of Illinois maintains a web site
“Counterfactual Research News,” where an extended list of references can be
found. The URL is http://www.psych.uiuc.edu/˜roese/cf/cfbib.htm. In his book,
Roese (2005) describes the relation between regret and decision making to the
general public.
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in driving voter participation decisions. Abstaining voters suffer regret
because not voting is deemed ethically wrong in democratic societies
and disappoints peers from the same partisan group.16 We make the
assumption that an abstaining voter’s regret on the winning side is
less than that on the losing side. In addition, such regret increases
as the election result becomes close. We believe these assumptions
are plausible and intuitively appealing. Though empirical evidence
that supports them is not widely available, they can be readily tested
with surveys of potential voters. As we discuss below, the experimen-
tal study conducted by Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) does provide
evidence in support of the existence of voter regret.
In the following discussion, we want to address the concern that
voters in our model experience regret even though they know their
votes do not affect the outcome. It is our contention that people fre-
quently regret their decisions because they deem them ethically and
morally questionable and not because outcomes would have been dif-
ferent if they had acted differently. First, this fits into the broad defi-
nition by Landman (1993) above. In particular, regret can be caused
by feeling sorry for “transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes,” none
of which automatically implies real consequences. Second, examples of
people feeling regret abound where their actions are not decisive in the
outcomes. Many lawmakers (for example, Senator Robert Byrd, Con-
gressmen Bob Barr and Don Young) said they regretted their votes for
the Patriot Act even though the vote of each of them would not have
altered the outcome of the vote since the results were so lopsided. Ac-
cording to an ABC News report (January 5, 2007), of the 77 senators
who voted to give President George W. Bush war powers, 34 (includ-
ing John Kerry, John Edwards, Gordon Smith) expressed regret for
voting that way. As widely reported in the media, many voters say
they regret their vote or abstention in the 2000 election, even though
16Surveys consistently show that roughly 90 percent of Americans believe they
should vote even if their preferred candidate is certain to lose (Brody (1978)).
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each of them would not have altered the outcome of the election.17
Third, Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) provide some further evidence
with an experiment in a real election. They conducted a study with
the Dutch national elections in which they asked voters to express
their regret for their various actions (voting, abstention, voting for
a particular party, etc.). Again, in such elections, each individual’s
vote does not affect the outcome of the elections. Nevertheless, their
results showed that voters regretted their intention-action inconsisten-
cies, like intending to vote but failing to do so, or intending to vote
for x but voting for y instead. Though intention-action inconsisten-
cies were their focus, their results also showed that voters who did not
vote experience higher regret than those who did: those who intended
to vote but failed to do so experienced the strongest regret among all
groups; those who intended not to vote and did not vote (therefore
does not commit intention-action inconsistency) nevertheless experi-
enced higher regret than those who intended to vote for x and voted
for x in the election (see Table 1, p. 22 of their paper).
7 Concluding Remarks and Further Re-
search
In this paper, we have introduced a two-candidate model of electoral
competition in which potential voters are ethical in that they expe-
rience regret after the election if they did not vote. The regret is
inversely related to the margin of victory. Furthermore, voters on the
winning side experience less regret than those on the losing side. We
show that there is a unique equilibrium with strictly positive turnout.
Furthermore, voter turnout is positively related to the importance of
the election, and negatively related to the perceived lopsidedness of
17See, in addition to the poll we cited at the beginning of our paper, the book
by Patterson (2002) (p. 3).
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the competition. These are true both when voters are sure about the
proportion of voters that favor each candidate and when they are not.
We view our current research as laying a tractable framework
in which many interesting issues can be studied. In our model, the
positions of candidates and voters are exogenously given, so are the
proportions of voters who would vote for either candidate. Therefore,
we see many directions in which this model can be extended. First,
candidates need not have a predetermined position. They want to
position themselves to appeal to a larger proportion of potential vot-
ers. Also, the potential voter population need not be fixed. Election
campaigns dissipate information to more voters, and much effort is
devoted to attracting one’s own voters or discouraging opponents’.
Recent presidential and congressional campaigns in the United States
have seen the rise of negative tactics. An extended version of our
model may be suitable to analyze the effect of such tactics on election
outcomes. To be sure, many of the same issues have been studied
using the pivotal-voter model, and many insights have been derived
from these studies. However, as the pivotal-voter model fails to ac-
count for significantly positive turnout in large elections, arguably a
crucial feature of democratic elections, a model that does capture this
phenomenon is valuable at least as a device with which to verify the
validity of those theoretical findings.
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